🔐 Encryption

Data-in-Transit, Data-at-Rest, Keys that Never Leak

Encryption protects the confidentiality and integrity of data across apps, networks, and clouds.
SolveForce designs encryption as a system—with non-exportable keys (HSM/KMS), envelope encryption, modern ciphers, and audit-grade evidence—so data stays private, provable, and available without breaking performance.

Where encryption fits in the SolveForce model:
🔑 Keys → Key Management / HSM • 🪪 Trust → PKI
☁️ Platforms → Cloud • 🖧 Fabric → Networks & Data CentersConnectivity
📊 Evidence → SIEM / SOAR • 🔒 Access → IAM / SSO / MFAZTNASASE
🔏 Data controls → DLP


🎯 Outcomes (What “good” encryption delivers)

  • Confidentiality you can prove — keys never leave hardware; logs show who/what/when.
  • Integrity by default — AEAD modes (encrypt and authenticate) prevent silent tamper.
  • Fast rotation without data loss — envelope encryption (root→KEK→DEK) with re-wrap.
  • Low latency — sized KMS/HSM clusters; TLS 1.3 at the edge; local DEK caching.
  • Audit-ready — immutable evidence for PCI DSS, HIPAA, ISO 27001, NIST, CMMC.

🧱 Building Blocks (Spelled Out)

  • Keys & Custody — Root/KEK/DEK hierarchy, non-exportable keys in HSM/KMS, quorum/dual-control. → Key Management / HSM
  • Algorithms
  • Symmetric (bulk): AES-GCM/CTR, ChaCha20-Poly1305 (AEAD).
  • Asymmetric (identity/signing): Ed25519, ECDSA P-256/P-384, RSA-2048/3072.
  • Hashes/HMAC: SHA-256/384. (Avoid MD5/SHA-1.)
  • TransportTLS 1.3 first; mTLS where identity must be mutual; IPsec/MACsec for network/Link-layer.
  • At Rest — disk (XTS-AES), DB TDE, object SSE-KMS, field-level (AES-GCM or FPE, as policy).
  • PKI — certificates, ACME automation, JWKS for token signing/rotation. → PKI

🚦 Quick Decision Table

GoalRecommended
API / Web trafficTLS 1.3 (fallback 1.2 only if needed). Ciphers: AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305
Mutual service identitymTLS with short-lived certs; rotate via ACME
Private network hopIPsec (site-to-site) or MACsec (L2)
Disk / volumeXTS-AES (BitLocker/FileVault/LUKS), rotate keys with KMS
DatabaseTDE; KEK in HSM/KMS; DEKs per tablespace
Object storageSSE-KMS with customer-managed keys (CMK)
Field-level protectionAES-GCM (preferred) or FPE for format-sensitive fields
Tokens/IDJWS (Ed25519/ECDSA); publish/rotate via JWKS; use kid headers
Secrets at restVault + KMS wrap; never store raw keys in code/containers

🌐 Data-in-Transit (Modern TLS & friends)

  • TLS 1.3 default; deprecate 1.0/1.1; prune weak ciphers.
  • Ciphers: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (mobile-friendly).
  • Server policy: HSTS, OCSP stapling, ALPN (HTTP/2 & HTTP/3), Session resumption tickets with short lifetimes.
  • mTLS: short-lived client certs (hours/days), ACME automation, CRL/OCSP for revocation.
  • IPsec (site-to-site): IKEv2, PFS, AES-GCM; pair with SD-WAN policy. → SD-WAN
  • MACsec (L2): encrypt switch-to-switch or server uplinks in hostile domains/cages.
  • Cloud on-ramps: use Direct Connect/ExpressRoute/Interconnect for deterministic paths; TLS still applies end-to-end. → Direct Connect

Don’t: mix compression with encryption on the wire (CRIME/BREACH risks).


💾 Data-at-Rest (Disk, DB, Object, Field)

  • Disks/Volumes: XTS-AES (BitLocker/FileVault/LUKS). Keys in KMS; rotate on schedule and events.
  • Databases: TDE; master key in HSM/KMS, DEKs per tablespace; use re-wrap on KEK rotation.
  • Object Storage: SSE-KMS/SSE-C; per-bucket/object keys with tags & lifecycle.
  • Field-level: AES-GCM preferred; FPE (Format-Preserving Encryption) only when schema truly requires.
  • Tokenization vs Encryption: For PAN/PII that must retain format without revealing data, tokenize upstream and store surrogates. → DLP

🧠 Envelope Encryption (Rotate without re-encrypting data)

1) App gets a DEK (data key) to encrypt content.
2) DEK is wrapped by a KEK in HSM/KMS and stored alongside ciphertext.
3) Rotate KEK → re-wrap DEKs (fast).
4) Rotate DEK → new data uses new DEK; legacy re-encrypt on schedule.
5) Quorum/dual-control required for destructive steps.
→ Details: Key Management / HSM


🔐 JWT / Tokens / Signing (Don’t roll your own)

  • JWS for authenticity: Ed25519 or ECDSA P-256/384; RSA-2048/3072 if legacy.
  • JWKS endpoint for public keys; rotate with kid. Publish new keys before retiring old.
  • JWE only when confidentiality also needed; otherwise sign (JWS) and encrypt channel (TLS).
  • Short-lived tokens, refresh with narrow scope; revoke on incident.
    → Trust fabric: PKIIAM / SSO / MFA

🧩 Integration Patterns

  • KMS/HSM first — apps never see raw KEKs; use KMS “data key” API; cache DEKs with TTL. → Key Management / HSM
  • Vault for app secrets; auto-rotate; short TTL for tokens/creds.
  • NAC/SD-WAN/SASE — encrypt links (IPsec/MACsec), steer paths, enforce posture. → SASE
  • DLP + Encryption — enforce encryption for sensitive flows/objects; watermark read-only exports. → DLP
  • SIEM/SOAR — log key ops, TLS events, failures; playbooks for disable/rekey/rotate on incident. → SIEM / SOAR

🧪 Hardening & Pitfalls (Field Notes)

  • Use AEAD (AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305) — encryption and integrity together.
  • Never reuse nonces/IVs; generate with secure RNG; unique per (key, message).
  • Avoid home-grown crypto; rely on vetted libraries/HSM/KMS SDKs.
  • KDFs for passwords: Argon2id or PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 (high iteration, per-user salt).
  • Padding oracles: prefer AEAD; if CBC must be used, implement constant-time checks & MAC-then-encrypt patterns.
  • Don’t mix compression + encryption for secrets; sanitize before encrypting.
  • Certificates: automate ACME; pin with care (operationally dangerous without rotation plan).

📐 SLO Guardrails (Experience you can measure)

Metric (p95)TargetNotes
TLS handshake (regional)≤ 50–150 msEdge PoPs, session resumption enabled
mTLS mutual auth≤ 100–250 msCert chain size & OCSP stapling matter
KMS encrypt/decrypt≤ 10–30 msRegional KMS, DEK caching
JWT sign/verify≤ 20–50 msHSM-backed key ops
Service availability≥ 99.99%HA KMS/HSM, multi-region optional
Rotation (KEK)≤ 24–72 hEnvelope re-wrap only

Expose crypto SLOs on dashboards; alert on lag, error rate, and tamper events. → SIEM / SOAR


📜 Compliance Mapping (Examples)

  • PCI DSS 3.5/3.6 — key protection, rotation, split knowledge & dual control.
  • HIPAA 164.312(a)(2)(iv) — encryption of ePHI; integrity and access controls.
  • ISO/IEC 27001/27002 — cryptographic policy, key management, logging.
  • NIST SP 800-57 / 800-52 / 800-53 (SC-12/SC-13) — key lifecycles, TLS profiles, crypto services.
  • FedRAMP — KMS/HSM posture, key residency, audit retention.

Evidence streams to SIEM; playbooks in SOAR handle disable/rotate/restore.


🛠️ Implementation Blueprint (No-Surprise Rollout)

  1. Inventory & classify data (where it lives, flows, exits).
  2. Select custody — HSM/KMS platforms, FIPS level, HA/DR regions. → Key Management / HSM
  3. Design hierarchy — Root in HSM; KEKs per service/tenant/env; DEKs per dataset/object.
  4. Transport policy — TLS 1.3, mTLS where needed; IPsec/MACsec for hops.
  5. At-rest controls — TDE, SSE-KMS, field-level; tokenization for PAN/PII. → DLP
  6. PKI & tokens — ACME automation; JWKS rotation; short-lived tokens. → PKIIAM / SSO / MFA
  7. Observability — crypto SLOs; KMS/HSM tamper alerts; TLS error maps. → SIEM / SOAR
  8. Compliance packs — policy docs, SOPs, rotation calendar, evidence exports.
  9. Game days — KEK rotation, disable/restore drills, region failover.

✅ Pre-Engagement Checklist

  • 🔑 HSM/KMS choices, regions, FIPS level, HA/DR plan.
  • 📦 Data classes & flows; tokenization vs field encryption decisions.
  • 🧰 Library/SDK standards (approved crypto libs, AEAD default).
  • 🪪 PKI plan (issuance/rotation), JWKS strategy, short-lived tokens.
  • 🔐 Network posture (IPsec/MACsec needs), TLS policy/cipher list.
  • 📊 SIEM dashboards (crypto SLOs), SOAR runbooks (disable/rotate/restore).
  • 🧾 Compliance targets and evidence format.

🔄 Where Encryption Fits (Recursive View)

1) Grammar — encrypted signals ride Connectivity & the Networks & Data Centers fabric.
2) SyntaxCloud patterns (TDE, SSE-KMS, mTLS) shape delivery.
3) SemanticsCybersecurity preserves truth; encryption proves confidentiality/integrity.
4) PragmaticsSolveForce AI flags crypto anomalies, failed handshakes, and hot keys.
5) Foundation — consistent terms via Primacy of Language.
6) Map — indexed in the SolveForce Codex & Knowledge Hub.


📞 Design Encryption That’s Fast, Safe & Auditable

Related pages:
Key Management / HSMPKIIAM / SSO / MFAZTNASASEDLPCloudNetworks & Data CentersDirect ConnectSIEM / SOARCybersecurityKnowledge Hub