Data-in-Transit, Data-at-Rest, Keys that Never Leak
Encryption protects the confidentiality and integrity of data across apps, networks, and clouds.
SolveForce designs encryption as a systemβwith non-exportable keys (HSM/KMS), envelope encryption, modern ciphers, and audit-grade evidenceβso data stays private, provable, and available without breaking performance.
- π (888) 765-8301
- βοΈ contact@solveforce.com
Where encryption fits in the SolveForce model:
π Keys β Key Management / HSM β’ πͺͺ Trust β PKI
βοΈ Platforms β Cloud β’ π§ Fabric β Networks & Data Centers β’ Connectivity
π Evidence β SIEM / SOAR β’ π Access β IAM / SSO / MFA β’ ZTNA β’ SASE
π Data controls β DLP
π― Outcomes (What βgoodβ encryption delivers)
- Confidentiality you can prove β keys never leave hardware; logs show who/what/when.
- Integrity by default β AEAD modes (encrypt and authenticate) prevent silent tamper.
- Fast rotation without data loss β envelope encryption (rootβKEKβDEK) with re-wrap.
- Low latency β sized KMS/HSM clusters; TLS 1.3 at the edge; local DEK caching.
- Audit-ready β immutable evidence for PCI DSS, HIPAA, ISO 27001, NIST, CMMC.
π§± Building Blocks (Spelled Out)
- Keys & Custody β Root/KEK/DEK hierarchy, non-exportable keys in HSM/KMS, quorum/dual-control. β Key Management / HSM
- Algorithms
- Symmetric (bulk): AES-GCM/CTR, ChaCha20-Poly1305 (AEAD).
- Asymmetric (identity/signing): Ed25519, ECDSA P-256/P-384, RSA-2048/3072.
- Hashes/HMAC: SHA-256/384. (Avoid MD5/SHA-1.)
- Transport β TLS 1.3 first; mTLS where identity must be mutual; IPsec/MACsec for network/Link-layer.
- At Rest β disk (XTS-AES), DB TDE, object SSE-KMS, field-level (AES-GCM or FPE, as policy).
- PKI β certificates, ACME automation, JWKS for token signing/rotation. β PKI
π¦ Quick Decision Table
Goal | Recommended |
---|---|
API / Web traffic | TLS 1.3 (fallback 1.2 only if needed). Ciphers: AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 |
Mutual service identity | mTLS with short-lived certs; rotate via ACME |
Private network hop | IPsec (site-to-site) or MACsec (L2) |
Disk / volume | XTS-AES (BitLocker/FileVault/LUKS), rotate keys with KMS |
Database | TDE; KEK in HSM/KMS; DEKs per tablespace |
Object storage | SSE-KMS with customer-managed keys (CMK) |
Field-level protection | AES-GCM (preferred) or FPE for format-sensitive fields |
Tokens/ID | JWS (Ed25519/ECDSA); publish/rotate via JWKS; use kid headers |
Secrets at rest | Vault + KMS wrap; never store raw keys in code/containers |
π Data-in-Transit (Modern TLS & friends)
- TLS 1.3 default; deprecate 1.0/1.1; prune weak ciphers.
- Ciphers: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (mobile-friendly).
- Server policy: HSTS, OCSP stapling, ALPN (HTTP/2 & HTTP/3), Session resumption tickets with short lifetimes.
- mTLS: short-lived client certs (hours/days), ACME automation, CRL/OCSP for revocation.
- IPsec (site-to-site): IKEv2, PFS, AES-GCM; pair with SD-WAN policy. β SD-WAN
- MACsec (L2): encrypt switch-to-switch or server uplinks in hostile domains/cages.
- Cloud on-ramps: use Direct Connect/ExpressRoute/Interconnect for deterministic paths; TLS still applies end-to-end. β Direct Connect
Donβt: mix compression with encryption on the wire (CRIME/BREACH risks).
πΎ Data-at-Rest (Disk, DB, Object, Field)
- Disks/Volumes: XTS-AES (BitLocker/FileVault/LUKS). Keys in KMS; rotate on schedule and events.
- Databases: TDE; master key in HSM/KMS, DEKs per tablespace; use re-wrap on KEK rotation.
- Object Storage: SSE-KMS/SSE-C; per-bucket/object keys with tags & lifecycle.
- Field-level: AES-GCM preferred; FPE (Format-Preserving Encryption) only when schema truly requires.
- Tokenization vs Encryption: For PAN/PII that must retain format without revealing data, tokenize upstream and store surrogates. β DLP
π§ Envelope Encryption (Rotate without re-encrypting data)
1) App gets a DEK (data key) to encrypt content.
2) DEK is wrapped by a KEK in HSM/KMS and stored alongside ciphertext.
3) Rotate KEK β re-wrap DEKs (fast).
4) Rotate DEK β new data uses new DEK; legacy re-encrypt on schedule.
5) Quorum/dual-control required for destructive steps.
β Details: Key Management / HSM
π JWT / Tokens / Signing (Donβt roll your own)
- JWS for authenticity: Ed25519 or ECDSA P-256/384; RSA-2048/3072 if legacy.
- JWKS endpoint for public keys; rotate with
kid
. Publish new keys before retiring old. - JWE only when confidentiality also needed; otherwise sign (JWS) and encrypt channel (TLS).
- Short-lived tokens, refresh with narrow scope; revoke on incident.
β Trust fabric: PKI β’ IAM / SSO / MFA
π§© Integration Patterns
- KMS/HSM first β apps never see raw KEKs; use KMS βdata keyβ API; cache DEKs with TTL. β Key Management / HSM
- Vault for app secrets; auto-rotate; short TTL for tokens/creds.
- NAC/SD-WAN/SASE β encrypt links (IPsec/MACsec), steer paths, enforce posture. β SASE
- DLP + Encryption β enforce encryption for sensitive flows/objects; watermark read-only exports. β DLP
- SIEM/SOAR β log key ops, TLS events, failures; playbooks for disable/rekey/rotate on incident. β SIEM / SOAR
π§ͺ Hardening & Pitfalls (Field Notes)
- Use AEAD (AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305) β encryption and integrity together.
- Never reuse nonces/IVs; generate with secure RNG; unique per (key, message).
- Avoid home-grown crypto; rely on vetted libraries/HSM/KMS SDKs.
- KDFs for passwords: Argon2id or PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 (high iteration, per-user salt).
- Padding oracles: prefer AEAD; if CBC must be used, implement constant-time checks & MAC-then-encrypt patterns.
- Donβt mix compression + encryption for secrets; sanitize before encrypting.
- Certificates: automate ACME; pin with care (operationally dangerous without rotation plan).
π SLO Guardrails (Experience you can measure)
Metric (p95) | Target | Notes |
---|---|---|
TLS handshake (regional) | β€ 50β150 ms | Edge PoPs, session resumption enabled |
mTLS mutual auth | β€ 100β250 ms | Cert chain size & OCSP stapling matter |
KMS encrypt/decrypt | β€ 10β30 ms | Regional KMS, DEK caching |
JWT sign/verify | β€ 20β50 ms | HSM-backed key ops |
Service availability | β₯ 99.99% | HA KMS/HSM, multi-region optional |
Rotation (KEK) | β€ 24β72 h | Envelope re-wrap only |
Expose crypto SLOs on dashboards; alert on lag, error rate, and tamper events. β SIEM / SOAR
π Compliance Mapping (Examples)
- PCI DSS 3.5/3.6 β key protection, rotation, split knowledge & dual control.
- HIPAA 164.312(a)(2)(iv) β encryption of ePHI; integrity and access controls.
- ISO/IEC 27001/27002 β cryptographic policy, key management, logging.
- NIST SP 800-57 / 800-52 / 800-53 (SC-12/SC-13) β key lifecycles, TLS profiles, crypto services.
- FedRAMP β KMS/HSM posture, key residency, audit retention.
Evidence streams to SIEM; playbooks in SOAR handle disable/rotate/restore.
π οΈ Implementation Blueprint (No-Surprise Rollout)
- Inventory & classify data (where it lives, flows, exits).
- Select custody β HSM/KMS platforms, FIPS level, HA/DR regions. β Key Management / HSM
- Design hierarchy β Root in HSM; KEKs per service/tenant/env; DEKs per dataset/object.
- Transport policy β TLS 1.3, mTLS where needed; IPsec/MACsec for hops.
- At-rest controls β TDE, SSE-KMS, field-level; tokenization for PAN/PII. β DLP
- PKI & tokens β ACME automation; JWKS rotation; short-lived tokens. β PKI β’ IAM / SSO / MFA
- Observability β crypto SLOs; KMS/HSM tamper alerts; TLS error maps. β SIEM / SOAR
- Compliance packs β policy docs, SOPs, rotation calendar, evidence exports.
- Game days β KEK rotation, disable/restore drills, region failover.
β Pre-Engagement Checklist
- π HSM/KMS choices, regions, FIPS level, HA/DR plan.
- π¦ Data classes & flows; tokenization vs field encryption decisions.
- π§° Library/SDK standards (approved crypto libs, AEAD default).
- πͺͺ PKI plan (issuance/rotation), JWKS strategy, short-lived tokens.
- π Network posture (IPsec/MACsec needs), TLS policy/cipher list.
- π SIEM dashboards (crypto SLOs), SOAR runbooks (disable/rotate/restore).
- π§Ύ Compliance targets and evidence format.
π Where Encryption Fits (Recursive View)
1) Grammar β encrypted signals ride Connectivity & the Networks & Data Centers fabric.
2) Syntax β Cloud patterns (TDE, SSE-KMS, mTLS) shape delivery.
3) Semantics β Cybersecurity preserves truth; encryption proves confidentiality/integrity.
4) Pragmatics β SolveForce AI flags crypto anomalies, failed handshakes, and hot keys.
5) Foundation β consistent terms via Primacy of Language.
6) Map β indexed in the SolveForce Codex & Knowledge Hub.
π Design Encryption Thatβs Fast, Safe & Auditable
- π (888) 765-8301
- βοΈ contact@solveforce.com
Related pages:
Key Management / HSM β’ PKI β’ IAM / SSO / MFA β’ ZTNA β’ SASE β’ DLP β’ Cloud β’ Networks & Data Centers β’ Direct Connect β’ SIEM / SOAR β’ Cybersecurity β’ Knowledge Hub